Lost in the Horizon: Irigaray\u27s Heidegger by Molina, Joanne
I 





Heidegger's fundamental ontology was written to ex­
plore the primordial question of Being. His ontology, written 
to address the question, "What is the being that is Da-sein?" 
is defined by describing the structure of the being who is able 
to ask this question. He provides Being's structure, which is 
Care, and then determines the unifying location of this being, 
which is temporality. Heidegger specifies his concern by 
claiming that /lDa-sein no longer understands the most el­
emental con ditions which alone make a positive return to the 
past possible in the sense of its productive appropriation" 
(BT 17). His two Divisions account for this task, Division I, 
accounting for the description of Being (Da-sein) and Divi­
sion II accounting for the temporalization of Being (Da-sein). 
Heidegger finishes his ontology by reminding us of our 
primordial task of finding a pathway towards being that 
allows us access to the primordial question of Being. 
Irigaray claims that the creative and ecstatic unily that is 
Da-sein is only possible because ofthe feminine represented 
as air. As she examines his fundamental ontology, she finds 
that Heidegger's foundations re-inscribe images of feminin­
ity into a sphere of forgetfulness and concealment, ending in 
the mourning of the death of the feminine to support a 
masculine world. lrigaray shows that Heidegger is commit­
ted to an ontology of presencing that remains unaware and 
uncritical of the absence associated with and used to sup­
press and bastardize the feminine. Irigaray concludes that 
Heidegger's quest for authenticity and possibility fails. She 
claims that his entire ontology, which projects a way of 
understanding man's place in/as/through being-in-the­
world, mustbe reconsidered. She claims that this productive 
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appropriation of the question of Being asked by Da-sein is 
another exploitative means by which a masculine economy 
asserts itself as the active and heroic subject. 
Air is automatically trapped in a double bind. It cannot 
be seen or presenced but always acts as the pathway for 
others and elements such as water, earth and fire. She claims 
that all previous philosophical understandings of the cosmos 
have always represented man in the brightness and useful­
ness of fire and it is this fire that has distinguished and 
illuminated the lives of others. However, what philosophy 
has failed to do is examine air (feminine), as it makes every­
thing possible. Heidegger has forgotten air and its attributes. 
But Heidegger's "forgetfulness of air" is not just a mere not 
remembering air and how it is appropriated in the context of 
philosophical discourse. Rather, lrigaray is drawing specifi­
cally upon the Heideggarian notion of forgetfulness. His 
notion of forgetfulness stems from /I a positive, ecstatic mode 
of having-been; a mode with a character of its own. The 
ecstasy (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing 
away.... ecstatically dosing off what it is backing away from 
and thus closes itself off too ..." (BT312). So, if the feminine is 
represented in the element of air, which cannot rely on its 
ability to be seen or heard, then it is forgotten and concealed. 
But, as Heidegger's owndefinition states, this concealmentis 
not without repose. If we are in the constant ecstasy of 
forgetting air, thenmanhas also closed off his own possibility 
for authentic revelation and the ability to question in an 
a uthentic manner. 
The very notion oflogos presupposes the existence of air, 
but it must always already be forgotten in order to show 
presence through vision or speech. Heidegger conceptual­
izes logos as " ...deloun, tomakemanifestwhatis being talked 
about in speech .... " (BT 28). He then attempts to link the idea 
of speech as "letting us see something" with the idea of 
synthesis that allows us to see something in its unity and 
completeness. Rather, he is trying to show that the possibility 
of letting things be seen together in a way that 1/ ... no longer 
takes the form of a pure letting-be-seen, but rather in its 
indicating always has recourse to something else and so 
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always lets something be seen as something .... also the pos­
sibility of covering up" (BT30). Logos allows us to see things 
as things and this image has the potentiality of being con­
cealed or unconcealed. 
lrigaray claims, II nothing comes into appearance that has 
not dwelt originallyin the natural element (air) .... that has not 
first taken root in an environment that nourished it undis­
turbed by any gaze .... Shielded from the unveiling of any 
fixed form" (Mortenson 73). Irigaray's air gives without 
limitations and without demonstration, the air which is 
deploying and being deployed (Irigaray43). Air is constantly 
makingpresent life and the ability to have presence, but it can 
never be presenced or articulated because of its very nature 
of transparency and fluidity that must be forgotten for logos 
to play its part in the presendng of man through vision and 
speech. Irigaray shows that "Being is the original ecstasy, 
where man exists inpermanent representation," and this is in 
concordance with Heidegger's own notion of forgetfulness 
as an ecstatic activity (Irigaray 43). 
According to Irigaray, the only thing that can ever be 
heard in language is the v oice of masculine presencing. Inhis 
"Origin on the Work of Art," Heidegger states quite clearly 
that "language, by naming things for the first time, first 
brings Beings to word and appearance" (BW 185). This 
evokes lrigaray's concern with logos and its direct relation­
ship with presencing and speech. However, Heidegger 
continues more affectively, stating " ... where there is no 
language.... there is no openness of beings ..." (BW185). This 
direct and compelling remark indicates that the later 
Heidegger is much more explicit about the implicit need for 
presencing based on articulation which is a direct descen­
dent, ifnot embodiment of the logos that is articulated in his 
early work. Addressing this privileging of presencing through 
the concreteness of language, she embraces air, claiming that 
it inviSibly supports all reproduction of the visible. Still, she 
reminds us that it is only his voice can be present and heard 
in air. "It is present where she is in absence and the absence 
of the Other is revealed only through air - which is always 
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revealed in access, but without appearance or apparatus ­
this voice is a porthole for air. But the passageway that exists 
for his voice is forgotten and is appropriated as logos and the 
trace of air and fluidity is assimilated into his voice and is 
forgotten" (Irigaray 48). So language is also directly rooted 
in the absence of air and is formulated only against a back­
ground of forgetfulness. 
II 
Heidegger's "call of conscience" can also be subject to 
Irigaray's analysis and actually elaborates her discussion of 
how air, as silence, is used quite explicitly to formulate the 
authenticity located in the anticipatory resoluteness of being­
towards-death. Heidegger's call of conscience can only be 
heard ifone experiences Anxiety and subsequently flees into 
the Nothingness. In fact, one of the first descriptions 
Heidegger offers us is Da-sein "being held out into the 
nothingness of being, held as a relation" (BT 6). So, in order 
for us to have the experience that allows for authenticity, we 
must have the negative experience of being held into the 
Nothingness, provided only by the call that summons us to 
examine our possibilities; the call of silence. According to 
Heidegger, this call must be silent because it is the only kind 
of call that can forget about the"idle talk" of Das Man (rooted 
in the traditional language of tradition; logos). 
However, this silence only acts as the summons. It is 
/I ...named and assigned a place, a statute, a name: established 
in the system of relation for existence and crOSSing" by Das 
Man and is used only as a mechanism that is purely contin­
gent, although always available (Irigaray 114). Even when 
we hear the call of silence, Heidegger reminds us that is only 
Da-sein calling back to itself and its own possibilities, consti­
tuted through the structure of Da-sein and its temporal 
location. So, this silence is never able to be comprehended or 
heard as a present and intelligible voice of another. It is 
merely a part of the assimilation process which results in the 
completion of an authentic self that must return to its own 
face to have an authentic existence. Irigaray argues that this 
assimilation through airis always out in the openbut, as with 
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language and presencing, it is without voice and so it is 
doomed to be forgotten as soon as it is deployed. By desig­
nating this call as silence and separating it from Das Man, we 
forget about the existence of air (Otherness) and how it 
completely shapes both the realm of authentic (and inauthen­
tic) existence by its very absence and ability to never be heard 
or presenced. 
In this process of moving towards authenticity, not only 
is her absence forgotten, but her difference is assimilated 
entirely into his voice and his words. He keeps her as silence 
and Nothingness, as something which can never have a 
voice, but as something that is originally encountered as 
different and fearfut as Anxiety. However, as he utilizes her, 
he assimilates her difference into himself and maintains her 
as forgotten. So, in the final moment of resoluteness, the 
decision that Da-sein can and will be called into exploring the 
possibilities of its own thrownness into a particular location, 
we have completely forgotten about the silence (air) that 
makes this possible. The forgetfulness of her in silence be­
comes essential to move beyond the Nothingness that we are 
held out into, allowing for resoluteness. lrigaray claims that 
the very repetition of the return to the Nothingness maintains 
this forgetfulness. As we are drawn into the Nothingness, 
nothing ever reflects the Nothingness. Instead we are only 
involved in the constant utilization and repetition ofthis use 
ofthe Nothingness. It is of importance to note that Heidegger 
also discusses the nullity that results from the possibility of 
hearing the call and choosing. One might suggest that one 
could appropriate air simply as something we could choose 
or just "recognize" as we emerge from our thrownness into 
our authenticity. However, nullity results in guiltiness, 
which resides in the inability to make evelY choice, inescap­
ably residing in a transcendental always already guilty. This 
guiltiness conceals, just as logos, the very element that is 
essential in making a call towards authenticity possible. 
lrigaray describes the appropriation of air (feminine) in the 
Nothingness as /I a sameness, transparent, where everyone 
comes into presence in giving and receiving .... everyone in 
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the reflection of his being" (Irigaray 69). Again, it is impera­
tive that we realize that we only receive this call and are 
thrown into the Nothingness and Anxiety so we canbe called 
back to our own thrownness that provides the groundless 
grounding (air) for Da-sein. 
In addition, lrigaray discusses the role of the masculine 
economy in the Heideggarian discussion of being-towards­
death. Irigaray claims that everyone gives and returns to him 
(masculinity) in his death - his proper Being. We are called 
only into the realization that we are made present by 
thrownness and the possibilities afforded to us through/by 
logos. She states, more affectively, that Being remains a 
residue of logos, while Air as our means and nutrience is 
completely forgotten (Irigaray 112-3). Irigaray implicitly 
links the Nothingness and the silence that is forgotten in the 
call of conscience and the resoluteness that is present in 
Heidegger's authentic being-towards-death. As Heidegger 
describes this phenomenon, he describes it terms of finitude 
and then elaborates on it as part of our existential structure. 
He asserts that it exists as a certainty; not as a mere option that 
we can cast aside, but as something that must remain with us 
at all times without being constantly present. Being-to­
wards-death is revealed as one of Heidegger's final steps 
toward authenticity; anticipatory resoluteness, which is re­
vealed as we anticipate out being-towards-death in such as 
way that unconceals our possibilities. This mode of achiev­
ing authenticity built upon the absolute forgetfulness of air 
(feminine)is represented as silence and absence. lrigaray 
argues that because of this forgetfulness, man is in constant 
mourning for the actual origin of his authentic possibilities 
and that Being-towards-death is actually mourning the for­
getfulness of air (feminine). His brief encounter in the 
Nothingness leaves a residue that leads to the eventual 
mourning of the air that surrounds him in his everydayness, 
as it makes this everydayness possible. lrigaray discusses 
how "Being becomes the veil of mourning, as a shade (cover) 
of absence that deploys and reploys his opening and her 
assimilation and continues in the serenity of his thoughL" 
(Irigaray 75). In this mourning she (air) becomes a trace and 
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a mystery. She continues to claim that this mourning that 
occurs with the forgetfulness of air, while condemning air to 
absolute isolation, is the only way that air is even maintained 
without absolute obliteration and destruction. Irigaray claims 
that air is /I ... crypted in mourning, retired in his forgetful­
ness. She is always placed for him in memorial of his own 
being-there .... always alive in and for death. His origins 
always enter the opening through a veiL./I (Irigaray 101). So, 
in order for Da-sein to become authentic in anticipatory 
resoluteness, it must constantly be in the state of mourning 
the Otherness, known onlythrough absence or the encounter 
with the Nothingness, and existing only for the possibility of 
Da-sein to recover itself, assimilating the moment of silence 
into its own pathways or possibilities. 
However, Heidegger finds himself caught in his own 
hermeneutical circle of understanding which lrigaray labels 
the /Icircle of forgetfulness." She elaborates on the forgetful­
ness present in the circle in a fashion similar to how she 
discusses silence and Nothingness. She describes man as 
"turning in an identical circle, he absorbs difference and 
assimila tes the other, he does not articulate the mystery of the 
difference irreducible to the same" (Irigaray 113). lrigaray 
elaborates, claiming that IIman and the world are reunited in 
the bewikhment of the circle" (Irigaray 77). Heidegger 
argues that any understanding of the past is automatically 
projected by the present, projecting its own future possibili­
ties. Irigaray claims that 1/ they accept forgetfulness inview of 
the future consequences" (Irigarayl05). The pastis automati­
cally shaped by the desires that exist as projections out of the 
Nothingness, initiating the stages of mourning. But it also 
conceals the absence and silence that make possible the 
futural projections that function as our possibilities. This 
means that 1/ ... the development of history occurs because of 
the permanent reserve of the deployment of the world, of 
being .../1 (Irigaray 123). The historical nature of Da-sein can 
only exist because of the way the circle is premised on the 
assimilation of everything into a presencing that occurs 
because ofthe logos thatforgets air. The circle of understand­
ing that gives man the ability to understand his presence in 
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the hermeneutical circle. It is her air that supports and 
provides for manls illumination of his own ontological struc­
ture and temporality. 
III 
It is important to note that Irigaray makes important 
references to themes in Heideggerls later works. She dis­
cusses the role of the poet and the artist in lieu of the openness 
of the hermeneutic circle. Heideggerl s later work gestures 
towards giving the poet and auteur god-like statuses because 
of their ability to use andpromote mechanisms that unconceal 
in an authentic way. In his "Origin on the Work of Art/' he 
makes this explicitl claiming that" the origin of something 
asks about its essence. The question concerning the origin of 
the work of art asks about its essential sourcell (BW149). He 
discusses how art operates in a cyclical model stating that" ... 
we are compelled to follow the circle .... to enter upon this 
path is the strength of thought.... not only is the main step 
from work to art a circle like the step from work to artl but 
every separate step that we attempt circles in this circlell (BW 
150). He immediately links the possibility of the 
unconcealment of art with that of the unconceal ability of the 
everydayness weencounter as part of the henneneutic circlel 
or Irigaray s "circle of forgetfulness/I This link is very 
important to Irigaray beca use she proposes that if the circle is 
maintained by;in; through airl which is always forgottenl 
then the work of art and the artist must reinforce this circle 
with their ability to unconceal and participate authentically 
in this circle. While Heidegger maintains that /I poetry is the 
saying of the concealedness of beings/' Irigaray reveals the 
poet in a different shade (BW185). She maintains that /I ... the 
poet arrives for the maintenance of openness. Renouncing 
the seal he casts in anchor in the native land.... he consecrates 
the house of gods ... 11 (Irigaray 104-5). Ifwe are to assume that 
the guardian of the openness of the circle of forgetfulness and 
Nothingness is the poet and the artist, then we are to assume 
that the presencing of the artist does, indeed, work to build 
the temple for the gods that Heidegger cites in his later work 
as being II in the brightness of the sun." In a similar fashion, 
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we are forced to accept Heidegger's assertion that poetry is 
II the saying of the world and earth, the saying of the arena .... 
the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods" (BW 
185). However, we should be cautious of those who create 
and maintain metaphors of presence and illumination (we 
will explore the precise implications of their building and 
brightness later). 
IV 
lrigaray continues to show how Heidegger fails to re­
solve the problem of positing Being as substantive in his final 
discussion of the historical pathways (clearing) of Da-sein. 
At the end of his Being and Time he states, "We must look for 
a way to illuminate the fundamental ontological question 
and follow it" (BT 398). She pursues this statement, and 
others similar to it, because of Heidegger's metaphors that 
focus entirely on the ability to appear and be seen. Irigaray 
develops her discussion of his metaphors quite early in her 
critique, discussing how his use of horizon and illumination 
shouldnot be taken superficially. She provides a provocative 
narrative that discusses the metaphoric implication of 
Heidegger's horizon and illumination. 
Irigaray begins her discussion of Heidegger' s horizon by 
discussing it in terms of a mode of establishing presence, a 
way of making known that relies on statisticity and place­
ment, discussing how the sun assists in awakening forgetful­
ness. The sun allows matter to be seen individually, sepa­
rated and at a distance. Butitis the source. It is always hidden 
in mourning (morning). With light as his source, man enters 
into the economy and into reserve. He begins to make/ 
ascribe absence to presence (Irigaray 44-5). Later, she re­
marks in a similar fashion, liThe morning, when the sunrises, 
that is when order is restored. Everything is there and posed 
in front of him in lumination. Matter, which does not allow 
that entrance into the Other, is day" (Irigaray 50). The only 
thing that designates what is placed and how it is placed is the 
sun, which is bright and heavy. The sun, then, represents his 
domination through the presencing that must occur whenwe 
become locked into a horizon. But Irigaray indicates that 
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"her being is not in a perceptible horizon. He is always 
entering through her." Unlike air, which flows through 
everything and allows for life, the sun shines on everything 
and makes present. She continues, claiming that /I this rising 
of the sunmarks the passage ofthe Other. Whenthesunrises, 
she is always inplace.. ,/1 (Irigaray 44). She states more specifi­
cally that because of the sun"... she is held at a distance and 
her movements are controllable .... this is the place she occu­
pies in the world, where she is named and approximated.... 
He is joyful with his mourning (morning)" (Irigaray 40). So 
Heidegger's discussion of the sun's rising reaffirms Irigaray's 
discussion of his obsession with presencing through assimi­
lation and domination. She finds that the sun is used as a 
metaphor for the logocentric origins of Heidegger's ontol­
ogy. Although the sun and the light attempt to illuminate 
and reveal her, she still remains air and every attempt at 
illumination results in a false presence and articulation of 
her. 
So, as we come to understand how man is concretely 
rooted in his ability to emerge in/from his ability to become 
present in his location, it is then necessary to look directly at 
Heidegger's vocabulary when he presents historicity. 
Heidegger first links historicity and metaphor when he slates, 
"that for more advanced Da-sein day and the presence of 
sunlight no longer possess an eminent function, because this 
Da-sein has the advantage of being able to tum the night into 
day"(BT381). This turning of night into day represents the 
extreme ability of the earth to not only illuminate the path­
way for itself, but to clear the pathway for history to emerge, 
to create a "clearing." Heidegger states in his later work, 
"Upon the earth and in it historical man grounds his dwell­
ing in the world" (BWl71). So the clearing for historical man 
must be grounded in the earth, which can illuminate itself 
and even have the possibility of aSSimilating the night into 
the day. This lighting, according to Heidegger, /I ••• grants and 
guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we 
ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves 
are..." (BW 175). The illumination of history that is made 
possible by the presencing of the earth is further assimilated 
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by the light which accompanies our passages to the openness 
of the circle of meaning and forgetfulness, where man always 
returns to himself. 
Irigaray contrasts Heidegger' s use of the sun and horizon 
with the transparency and fluidity of the night. She claims 
that" ...she (air) can only be heard when she cries in the 
night," and that"in the apparition of the night, when the sun 
is down, it is possible to enter ..." (Irigaray 45). It is interesting 
to look at Irigaray' s use of night to describe the location of the 
feminine (air). As her being is maintained in the nocturnal 
cover, she uses the metaphor that is usually associated with 
anxiety, despair, lostness, and darkness and is also associated 
with metaphors often denoting race (Irigaray 106). This is 
significant because she is maintaining the same kind of 
difference, the difference between night and day, that has 
traditionally categorized and exorcized woman from the 
realm of man. Irigaray opts to find difference in the pathway 
of the night that not only shows us Iia" way, but allows for 
many ways to emerge and confront each other without the 
blinding gaze of the sun. 
As we grasp Irigaray's critique of Heidegger's use of 
logos, historicity, and metaphor, it is useful to examine the 
traces of the Heideggerian paradigm in Irigaray's own work. 
Her work undeniably provides us with a provocative and 
revol utionary way of re-conceptualizing the role of the femi­
nine in the philosophical tradition, yet, her work also remains 
within Heidegger's shadow. In her essay "Irigaray Reading 
Heidegger," Joanna Hodge addresses Irigaray's use of 
Heidegger's IIorigin./f Irigaray's pronounced understanding 
of the matricide. that has plagued Western interpretative 
standards has arguably stemmed from II the originary from 
which a particular discursive formation is to stay in place .... 
An originary event articulates itself as omnipresent and 
recurrently affirmed set of parameters that open up certain 
lines of possibility while closing off others/f(Hodge 202). 
Hodge wants us to understand that Irigaray's practice in 
"looking for the silencing gesture of the alternative voices" is 
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made possible because of a methodology that was first recog­
nized by Heidegger's understanding of history, temporality, 
and unconcealment (Hodge 194). Heidegger writes: "the 
preconception shackles reflection on the Being of any given 
being.... We ought to turn toward the being, think a bout it in 
regard to its Being, but by means of this thinking at the same 
time let it rest upon itself in its very own essence" (BW160-1). 
Hodge clarifies this for us, explaining that the notion of the 
origin in history has everything to do with finding oneself in 
some sort of eternal return to sameness. This is the eternal 
return that lrigaray wants to avoid, yet simultaneously uses 
in order to evoke her notion of the forgetfulness of air. 
However, Hodge directs us towards Heideggerslater 
analysis of technology and claims that this marks the next 
prominent difference between Heidegger and lrigaray. 
Heidegger's discussion of the residues of technology lead 
him to fear " ... the distinction between what there is and 
human activity is eroded.... accomplished only at the cost of 
abolishing the autonomous existence of the objects of thought: 
putting wholly what there is at the disposal of human beings 
and our destructive urges" (Hodge 205-6). Heidegger grounds 
this fear in his earth metaphor (see previous section) and this 
is where Irigaray immediately objects. Hodge correctly 
maintains that Heidegger's later work asserts that the para­
dox of the twentieth century is 1/ the impossible logic of 
technology is to destroy what there is and replace it with 
human activity and its products .... working toward the de­
struction of the earth" (Hodge 206). Irigaray finds similar 
problems with the appropriation of the sameness that oblit­
erates sexual difference. But, she finds that instead of trying 
to save the earth, "there is a kind of change blowing over the 
earth's surface, disturbing the logic of sameness that lies 
concealed in Heidegger's invocation of the earth" (Hodge 
207). It is clear that the change that is blowing is wind. It is 
not blowing in the wind, but it is the recognition of air tha t can 
salvage the earth. She proposes that Irigaray is moving 
towards a space where "woman can disrupt the exclusive­
ness of philosophy .... the issues themselves are likely to 
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shift" (Hodge 207). 
However, while lrigaray investigates and reads 
Heideggers corpus using her air metaphor, representing the 
feminine, it may be wise on the part of the reader to be 
cautious when evaluating her analysis. lrigamy provides an 
extremely compelling and creative understanding of why 
Heidegger does not escape from metaphysical foundations 
that are the 1/origin" of the matricide and sublimation of the 
feminine. She is able to flush out Heidegger's dangerous 
commitment to a logos that sets the stage for language, 
historicity, and authenticity, all of which are articulated by 
the intense use of metaphor. But, one must also be cautious 
and worrisome when she returns to the same Greek concep­
tion of the foundational elements that create the world. Her 
return to the elements, while understood strategically as a 
counter-movement to Heideggers his own historical prefer­
ences and foundations, is a foundation that reflects an essen­
tialist position that resides in her own metaphor of air. Why 
does lrigamy posit sexual difference (as opposed to racial 
difference or other kinds of difference) as something that is 
originary and essential as the four elements? 
While lrigaray attempts to use air to locate the feminjne 
as that which offers fluidity and flexibility, she returns to a 
concept of femininity that is universalized. Statements that 
organize themselves around universal understandingofllher" 
and "man" can easily misconstrue an understanding of a 
clear and unproblematic reading of gender identity and 
creation. It might be important to make some sort of distinc­
tion, which is often evoked, but not enough in lrigaray's 
work, between the appropriation of air and air itself. Al­
though the difference between these two descriptions is, 
itself, not necessarily clear, as Irigaray does answer that air is 
only appropriated, it is necessary to have an understanding 
that does not bleed into a reading of air as the original and 
natural place of woman. This kind of reading could extend 
into a positing of the feminine and masculine that is only 
articulated in static metaphors, whether they are earth and 
air or descriptives such as masculine or feminine. If we are 
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trying to create a sphere to recognize sexual difference, or any 
kind of difference, then we must utilize a methodology that 
works with the intention of further deconstructing the iden­
tities that are subsumed by what we understand as mascu­
line/feminine and male/female. Irigaray returns to the 
Greek historical framework to discover that the appropria­
tion of air is responsible for the continued prevalence of 
matricide and the forgetfulness of the feminine. However, it 
is not clear after reading her analysis, whether she would be 
willing to posit and use a terminology that does not re­
inscribe these differences as being masculine and feminine. 
Irigaray does anexceptional job as aninterpreter of Heidegger, 
but one may want to worry about her own commitments to 
creating an alterative terminology. In the very moment of 
counter-acting Heidegger' s presencing, it is imperative that 
we not re-articulate the same ground with a counter-termi­
nology or counter element that is supposed to embody the 
complexities of difference(s). 
Yet, after providing this critique, it is fair to acknowledge 
that Irigaray is aware of the problems surrounding air and 
may address these problems with her metaphor. Ifwe under­
stand air as only an appropriation of womanhood, as some­
thing that has been named by the earth and its commitment 
to presencing, then we have flexibility in our understanding 
of womanhood. Then the question would no longer be 
posited around a "liberation" of air, but rather an intense re­
examination of the earth. Furthermore, the metaphor of air 
does provide a strong foundation for the maintenance of 
difference on the level of never being able to be seen as 
something clear or static. Instead, as Irigaray does mention 
in her work, it preserves differences. But, in light of these 
positiveand productive readings, one may inquire as to what 
kinds of other differences exist and whether those differences 
could not be accounted for in the appropriation of air and 
whether air may not be too "transparent" to address issues 
such as race and ethnici ty. Furthermore, are these differences 
as "natural" as the Aristotelian elements? 
In conclusion, Irigaray's creative and exciting critique of 
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Heidegger accurately shows that his use and understanding 
of logos, while not rooted in the mere presence or present, is 
still committed to a presencing that requires forgetfulness 
and the concealment of differences. She addresses his com­
mitment to presencing through language and her use of 
metaphor leads us to examine Heidegger's authentic Being­
towards-death and historicity as intensely problematic. 
Irigaray also intensely focuses on Heidegger's use of meta­
phor and descriptives. She examines his fascination with the 
illumination and the brightness of fire, his obsession with the 
earth, as well as his use of silence. By focusing on these 
elements, Irigaray aims to show, just as her other investiga­
tions into the Western philosophical tradition, how the ap­
propriation of difference has "originated." She develops 
Heidegger's own notion of forgetfulness to account for this 
phenomenon, recognizing her own commitment to some of 
the more productive implications of his work, as discussed 
by Hodge. Irigaray shows that the historicity and presencing 
thatHeidegger suggests as being core to the true understand­
ing of the unconcealment of Being, is rooted in a maintenance 
of assimilation and sublimation. 
Still, as we examine Irigaray' s own incredible response to 
Heidegger's problem, we find that it could be laden with 
overarching assumptions as well. While Hodge indicates 
that the productive critique of lrigaray shows how women 
have been named and appropriated, it is also necessary to be 
cautious when addressing elements that are deemed to be 
essential and natural. It vital that we draw a distinction 
between beingnamed and re-articulating that name. Irigaray's 
use of "he" and"she" implicitly suggests that she is merely 
re-articulating the historical use of these names, but she does 
not explicitly claim that these distinction are any more com­
plicated than "masculine" and "feminine." Her rooting 
sexual difference in the naturalness of the elements could fail 
as theoretical models that try to work away from the natural­
ness of the sex!gender distinction. These models may not 
show how other differences are just as important when 
investigating the negative recognitory techniques present in 
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the Western philosophical tradition. lrigaray's discussion of 
Heidegger, provocative and invigorating, leads towards an 
evaluation of Heidegger that allows us to utilize his work 
without subscribing to the illusion that he can escape the 
economy of presence and masculinity that emerges in his 
discourse. 
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